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BANKRUPTCY COSTS USING
EQUIVALENT RISK CLASSES:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Terrance R. Skant~ and 7710111as H. Strickland

Introduction

The objective of this study is to te,t empirically the Modigliani and Miller [7 .91
proposition which states that the co,t of equity capital changes in direct proportion
to changes in debt-equity ratio {DIE). holding business risk constant. In particular.
the study is designed to detect the existence of nontrivial bankruptcy and
reorganization costs which arc often cited a, one reason why equity co,ts might
increase at an increasing rate as D/ E increase,. The result, of the study ,upport
the MM proposition.
Capital Structure: Theor) and Evidence
Theoretical Work

According to Modigliani and Miller [7]. a taxies, world with perfect capital
markets will price investment, such that a firm·, o,·erall coM of capital is unafferted
by leverage. B) allowing an individual to borrow and lend. the arbitr:ige prnce,,
will insure that firm, are valued according to the ca~h ,trea1m generated by the
firm's a,,cb. Thi, relationship provide, the foundation for Proposition II',
assertion that" ithm a bu,ine,, ri,k class a h:vered firm·, cost uf equity'-' ill he
a linear function of rbk. a, ddined hy D E ratio. In other won.ls. capital ,tructure
b irrelevant.
Sub,e4uently. MM 191 made a correction that accounts for the firm·,
deductibility of 1m.:ome ta, expense,. Comidering mcomc taxc,. the relationship
hetwcen levcragc and required return on equit) for firm, in a singk bu,inc,,
risk cla,~ ha5 been de~cribed by MM 191 a~:
k'e
ku + (1-T) (ku-kd)B/S
(I)
where:
k'c
MM'\ predicted rcturn on equity
ku = return on unlevercd firm·\ e4uity
T
ta)( rate
kd
return on debt
B
market value of bond~
market value of ~tock.
s
The firm·~ predicted coM of equity capital. k'e, b a linear function of leverage.
BS. Moreover. bccau,e of the tax deductibility ofintere,t. the weighted average
cost of capital ~hould decline a~ the debt-equity ratio increase~. Although the
market for debt b perfect, the government's income tax \Ub~idy effectively reduces
the firm's debt cost and. in turn. suggesb an optimal capital ~tructure of JOO% debt.
Inefficiencies such a, bankruptcy and reorganization (BR) costs may explain
why 100% debt financing is not observed in practice. The increasing probability
of BR cost, as debt-equity ratio increa~es may mtroduce additional risk and raise
the cost of equity funds. thereby creating a risk premium in addition to the premium
found in MM's formulation in E4uation (I). Figure I depicts two risk premiums
41

'm"'!!

D

Q ~E

a

CZ

due to increasing leverage: (a) MM·~ hypothe~ized premium. k'e - ku. and (b)
the BR premium. This lauer premium is the difference between the actual cost
of equity. ke. and MM·s predicted coM of equity. k·e.
k

cost of equity, ke--.....,,.

,,."''

,

,,

, '

,,----- . _.-!
ku

_..

..;: _

- -

-

/]

Bankruptcy and
reorganization
risk premium

j ~'

s predicted
nsk premium

Pr~di£te<! cost o~ {'<flit}', k~e_ _
Operating risk

1-- ---------------LEVERAGE ( D/E}

}

premium

PREDICTED vs l\rJ1JAl. COST Of EQUITY
FIGURE: I

Miller (6) has argued that personal tax difference, on Mm:h and bond, create
an environment in which there is no optimal capital ,tructurc for the firm.'
Similarly. Stiglitz ( 11) argues that. in the ab~encc of nontrivial bankruptc) costs.
an individual can ·•undo.. (as did MM earlier) the firm·, financial policy dccb1ons.
The existence of individual market participant~. there fore. make, a ti mi's leverage
decisions irrelevant (within the firm·, debt capacity)
Empirical Work

Empirical tem generally focus on the behavior of a firm ·s weighted average
cost of equity. and hence. MM·s Proposnion L MM·, original article 171 included
evidence from two risl-. classe~. electric utilities and oil companies. Their results
showed a constant weighted average cost of capital. Wes ton [ 13) found decreasing
weighted average cost of capital due to increased leverage. The inconsistency
between this study and MM \ original finding lies m the definition of cost of
capital. The latter study"s cost of capital calculations included an e,timate of the
firm's growth rates. which were ignored in MM's original study. A decreasing
overall cost of capital supports Proposition II. The failure to detect an eventual
rising cost of capital (above an ··appropriate" DIE level) sugge!,tS an absence
of BR costs. 2
Hamada [4) found that sy!,tematic risk. and pre!,umably kc. was higher for
levered firm!, than unlevercd firm!>. The unlevered firms· ~y!>tematic risk. however.
was found by applying MM's Proposition 11 to a levered firm. His choice of risk
classes was the SEC two-digit indumy classification.
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R isk C lass Specification

The main problem in analyzing the effects of changing leverage on capital cost!,
centers on the empirical specification of a defensible risk class. MM (7. p. 2661
emphasize this point in their original work:
The next assumption play; a ~trategic role in the re,t of the analysis .
... firms can be divided into ..equivalent return .. [classes.) ... [The
return on) ... any firm ... is proportional to (and hence perfectly
correlated with) the return ... (on] any other finn in the same risk clas5.
This risk-class issue was a major criticism in the en,uing controversy. Durand
(3. p. 651). in a comment. states :
Another obstacle. which is crucial for MM's approach. i, the difficulty
of assembling a sample of corporations capable of supporting a
comparative. or cross-section type of analysis. The empirical analyst
will be unable to a!,semble any ,ample meeting the rigid requirements
of MM·, equivalent clas, . . .
Apparently this i,sue was voiced by other~ because MM [8. p. 6551 ,pecificall:,
referred to the problem in their reply:
We ,hould have said more clearly. in the very t>eginning perhap,.
that what determine, mcmber,hip in a cla!,, b the [ca,h flow I ,tream
generated by the a,~ets held by the firm. not the ,tream ac,·ruing to
the share,.
In all of the ,tut.lies cited. a major difficulty i, identifying firm, "ith idenucal
bu,iness risk. In thi; ,tudy firms "1th highly correlated operating ca,h !lo",
(r .98) were cla,5ified a, having (nearly) 1dcnt1cal bu,ine,, rbk. 3 This provide,
a straightforward procedure for finding an unlevered and levered firm with ,imilar
busine;, ri,k. Thu!, the impact of diffenng debt-equit} ratio, can be examined
while holding bu,ine,, ri,k rnn,tant.

Data and Methodology
The Compu,tat tape, ( 1961-1980) were u~ed a, a data ba,e. Debt-equity ratio,.
coM of equity capital. and cost of debt capital were based on I 8 year average,.
All operational detinit10n!, arc provided in Appcndi,-. A. The ,pcl·ific ,tcps u~ed
in the ~tudy are li,ted t>elow:
(I) Select all firm~ wllh available data. Cla~~ify the firm~ a~ unlcvercd if

their debt-equity ratio i~ le,, than or equal to 10%. There were 921 firm~
with available data: 102 and 819 were cla,~ificd a~ unlevered and levered.
respective! y.

(2) Calculate for each "unlevered .. firm the annual operating ca,h tlow~
for 18 year~ ( 1962-1979). Each unlevcred firm constitute~ one bu~ine~srisk cla~s.
(3) Find all levered firms with annual operating cash flow~ which exhibit
high correlation (r
.98) with an unlevered firm's operating cash flows.
Of the 102 unlevercd firms. 56 had at least one levered firm with highly
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correlated operating cash nows. In all. there were 344 levered firms
selected from the sample of 819. (One unlevered firm had 17 highly
correlated levered firms.) 4 There are 56 ;cts of firms. each set
representing a unique business ri~k class. Within each set. the business
risk is "identical" while O/E ratio varies. Thus according to Equation
(I). differences in cost of equity capital (MM's predicted k"e within a
single risk class) should be due to difference~ in D/ E ratio.
(4) Calculate the unlevered cost of equity. ku. for each of the 56 risk classes.
For each zero debt firm, the firm·~ realized co~t of capital is. of course,
ku. For all other "unlcvered" firms (0 < D/E . 10). as~ume that BR
costs are trivial at such low leveb of leverage. For the;c firms. ku can
be calculated from Equation (I). using a firm's realized co~t of equity,
the average cost of debt for the 1962-1979 period a~ reponed in Moody's
[ 10). and an assumed marginal tax rate of 48 % .
(5) For each levered firm. calculate k'e using Equation ( I). Calculation of
MM 's predicted cost of capital i~ a straightforward proce~s. ~ince ku
was determined for the unlevered firm~ and each has been matched with
one or more levered firms with identical operating risk. Thu~. each
levered firm·s ku is determined from a risk-identical unleveretl firm.
(6) For each levered firm, find the difference between realitctl co~t of equity.
ke. and predicted cost of equity. k'e. If there arc nontrivial BR cosb.
the difference (kc - k'c) should increa~e as DIE ratio increases. That is.
there would he a difference between kc and k'e. a~ ~hown in Figure I.
(7) Regress ke - k'e against D/E ratio. A positive ,lope coefficient would

md\catc nontrivial BR co,ts. while a zero slope Y>oultl ,upport the MM
Proposition II.
Results

The results are reported ( 1) for the entire sample and/~) with the utility firm,
excluded since their return to equity invc,ior~ is detcrminetl. in part at lea~t. by
regulatory boards rather than the market.
Table I dctaib the results of bmh samples. For all firms. we fintl an a, crage
debt-equity ratio of69%. After excluding utilities. the ratio decline, to 51 %. The
average difference between actual anti predictetl cost of equity is -0.6% for all
firms and rises lo 2.4 % with utilities exclutled. Thu,. there may be ~ome
specification error in the pretliction model. For example. the marginal tax rate
may be too high. Also. the use of book value for liabilities in the debt-equity
ratio may have rcsulteJ in a systematic understatement of debt-equity ratio.
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TABLE I
REGHESSION RESULTS

Entire Sarrple (N=344)

Utilities Excluded (N=254)

Descriptive Statistics
D/E Ratio
ke-k'e

Descriptive Statistics

Mean Std Dev
.688 .485
-.006 .126

D/E Ratio
ke-k'e

Regression Results
R Square
Std Error
Constant
Slope Coeff
Estimate
Std Error
t-significance

Mean Std Dev
.508 .411
.024 .121

Regression Results
.086
.121
.047

R Square
Std Error
Constant
Slope Coeff
Estimate
Std Error
t - significance

-.076

.OlJ

0.0

.003
.121
.032
-.015
.018
.407

The regrc55ion re,ult, for the entire ~ample reveal a nega11ve relation~hip
betv.een debt-equity ratio and the difference bctwen actual and pn:Jicted C05t of
equity (KDIFJ . While thc t-tc5t indicates a ~tati~tically ~ignificant rclation~hip.
the R-square hi only 0.09. In any event. the ~ign of the ~lope rndficient i, oppo~itc
of that expected in the case nf Jetectabk BR co~b.
After excluding the utility firm,. there i5 essentially no ,tatbtical relation-hip
between KDIF and DIE for the remaining 254 tirrm . The t-staliMic ha, a p-value
of -l0.7%. Thus, kc appear5 to 111crea5e a5 leverage increa~e~ only to the e,tent
hypothesized by MM", Propo,ition II. There i~ no Jctectable premium ti,r po5~ibk
bankruptcy and reorg:miLation cost,.
A direct examination of the re,1Jual ter111, rcwalcd n,J obviou, v1olation of
rcgres5ion a,~umption,. The variance of the error tl.'rm Joe, not appear to incrca~c
as D/E ratro or KDIF mcreases.

Concluding Remark~
The finJing5 of this study arc con5btent with MM\ preJictcd linear relationship between co5t of capital premium and leverage. An additional premium \\a~
not detected a5 leverage increa5eJ. Thu~. the incrca~ing probability of a tirm ·~
exposure to pos~ible bankruptcy and reorganization co~!\ doe~ not appear to
manifest it~elf as 50rnctimes hypothcsiLed.
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Footnote:,
I. However. Litzenberger and Van Horne 15 I a,,crt that the tax ,1dvantage of

debt remains.

2. In another ~tud). Warner I 121inve,tigatcd fourteen taikd railroad, and found
trivial direct bankruptcy CO\l\.
3. A similar methodology for a different purpo,e i, de~cnbed in Boat,man and

Baskin 111- They fou nd that high correlation coefficient~ were common (64
of 80 ca!>C, were over 0.95 with the modal value of 0.98).

4. One potential confounding factor i, the high degree of cnrrelallnn among
,ome of the unle\"crcd firm~ . A, a re~ult. ,1 parti<.:ular k\ en:d firm might
be high!) correlated (r2:.98) \\ith more than one unlcvcred firm. In order
to avoid duplication,. the levered firm wa, matched \\ 1th the llHN highly
correlated unlcvercd firm.
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Appendix A
Operational Definitions
The operation <lefinitions of variables used in thl\ study are outlined belov..
Compustat item number~ arc use<l in the equations that follow each verbal
definition.

Variable'

Definition/ Equation 2

Debt/Equity
Ratio for
year t

Book value of long-term debt/market value of
outstanding common stock

Operating cash
now for
year t

[D(9 .t)]/ [D(24.t)* D(25 .t)/ I 000]

Income from operation5 before taxe~ and depreciation
D(13.tJ

Cost of Equity
Capital for
year t

Change in market value of outstanding common plus
dividends/Market value of outstanding common at
beginning of year
[D(24.t)*D(25 ,l)/1 000) - (D(24.t- l)*D(25,t - I). 1000
+D(21,t)I/JD(24.t- l)"D(25.t - IJ/ 1000]

Cost of debt

Moody's Composite average of Corporate Bond yields
for 18 year perio<l (7. 248 %)

Marginal Tax Rate

As~umed to be 48 %

Notes:
I. D/E ratio. cost of equity and cost of debt reported m thi~ stud} are 18 year
averages.
2. Numbers in parenthesc~ arc Compusrat 11cm numbers. For example. D(9.t)
is data item number 9 for time period t. the book value of long-term debt for
year t.
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